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ARTICLES
REHABILITATING MENTAL DISORDER
EVIDENCE AFTER CLARK V. ARIZONA:
OF BURDENS, PRESUMPTIONS, AND
THE RIGHT TO RAISE REASONABLE
DOUBT
Dora W. Kleint
INTRODUCTION
A criminal trial is many things:' a quest for truth,2 a moral drama,3
a means of averting escalating cycles of private vengeance.4 At its
t Associate Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D., Vanderbilt University
Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of Pennsylvania; B.A., Swarthmore College. The
author thanks Michael Ariens, Gerald Reamey, John Schmolesky, and Texas Tech School of
Law faculty workshop participants-particularly Susan Fortney, Arnold Loewy, and Brian
Shannon-for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Catherine Murawski Deist and David
Vanderhider for excellent research assistance.
I See David P. Leonard, Rules of Evidence and Substantive Policy, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
797, 797 (1992) (noting that "the modem trial serves a complex blend of functions").
2 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("[T]he central purpose of a
criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence .... ); Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (describing "the very nature of a trial as a search for
truth").
3 See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and
Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 41 (1986-87) (noting "the important
cultural meaning of the trial-a social (even moral) drama calculated to reach acceptable
conclusions"); Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the
Unabomber, 24 VT. L. REV. 417, 495 (2000) ("[Clertain criminal trials are about more than guilt
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procedural core, though, a criminal trial is the defendant's
constitutionally prescribed opportunity5 to "test the prosecution's
case"-that is, to evaluate and to challenge the prosecution's
evidence against the defendant.6 At trial, the defendant is presumed
innocent, and this presumption is overcome only if the prosecution
proves every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.'
The right not to be found guilty of a crime absent proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a powerful right.8 It can be undermined, however,
or innocence. One function of trials is to expose, identify, and condemn evil." (footnote
omitted)).
4 See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in
Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 191 (2009) ("The criminal law takes as its object
the definition, deterrence, and punishment of proscribed violent behavior; indeed, the regulation
of interpersonal violence (and the arrogation to the state of the prerogative to inflict violence)
arguably is a primary focus of criminal lawmaking and theory." (citing DAVID GARLAND,
PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 74-81 (1990); Martha
Minow, Institutions and Emotions: Redressing Mass Violence, in THE PASSIONS OF THE
LAW 265, 265 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); James Q. Whitman, Between Self-Defense and
Vengeance/Between Social Contract and Monopoly of Violence, 39 TULSA L. REV. 901, 922-23
(2004)).
s U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . ."). Of course, the prevalence of plea bargaining in our current system
makes it costly for defendants to exercise this opportunity. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists,
Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (2006)
("Although jury trials remain an option even under a system dominated by plea bargaining
because a defendant can reject a plea and go to trial, the existence of plea bargaining
undermines the jury's power because it allows prosecutors to penalize defendants who exercise
their jury trial right.").
6 See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1994) (noting that
modem criminal trials are "an opportunity for the defendant's lawyer to test the prosecution
case"); see also Dwight Aarons, Adjudicating Claims of Innocence for the Capitally Condemned
in Tennessee: Embracing a Truth Forum, 76 TENN. L. REv. 511, 514 (2009) ("At trial, the
defendant traditionally puts the State to its proof, most commonly by pleading not guilty and
invoking the presumption of innocence.").
7 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) ("A person when first charged with a
crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established
beyond a reasonable doubt."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."); United States v.
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1406 (3d Cir. 1991) ("To gamer an acquittal, the defendant need only
plant in the jury's mind a reasonable doubt.").
8 See Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment Under the Constitution, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 221,
227 (noting that "[t]he most powerful procedural protection [the Constitution provides to those
accused of a crime] is the requirement that the government prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt"). In a recent series of Sixth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
this commitment to a constitutional requirement that criminal sanctions be based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of an offense. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court
ruled that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
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by rules that at first seem to have little to do with reasonable doubt or
with burdens of proof. For example, a rule that limits the admissibility
of a certain kind of defense evidence might appear only to implicate
questions about a state's authority to enact rules governing the
presentation of evidence at criminal trials-an authority that the states
generally possess.9 But rules that prohibit criminal defendants from
presenting evidence might effectively, even if inadvertently, lessen
the prosecution's burden and allow for guilty verdicts on the basis of
proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.10
In the recent case of Clark v. Arizona," the Supreme Court
considered whether states may enact rules that categorically prohibit
criminal defendants from offering mental disorder evidence for the
purpose of raising reasonable doubt regarding the mens rea element
of a charged offense.12 Arizona law allows criminal defendants to
present mental disorder evidence only for the purpose of proving
insanity; it prohibits other uses of such evidence by criminal
defendants. 13 A defendant can be found "guilty except insane"
(Arizona's version of an insanity verdictl 4) if he establishes, by clear
beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Then, in Blakely v. Washington, the
Court ruled that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant." 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Finally, in United States v. Booker the Court said that
"[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding
the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 543 U.S. 220, 244
(2005).
9 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) ("[S]tate and federal
rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence
from criminal trials."); cf Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (explaining that
"the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of
the wisdom of state evidentiary rules"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) ("The States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.").
10 See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
" 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
12 See id. at 742. The Court framed the issue as
whether Arizona violates due process in restricting consideration of defense evidence
of mental illness and incapacity to its bearing on a claim of insanity, thus eliminating
its significance directly on the issue of the mental element of the crime charged
(known in legal shorthand as the mens rea, or guilty mind).
Id.
1 See id. at 756-57 (explaining the Arizona Supreme Court's rule that mental disorder
evidence "could be considered, [but] only for its bearing on an insanity defense; such evidence
could not be considered on the element of mens rea"); State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz.
1997) (en banc) ("Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of
insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime.").
14 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(D) (2001 & Supp. 2009). Under Arizona law, a
"guilty except insane" verdict means that the defendant is subject to civil commitment for the
amount of time that he would have been subject to incarceration if he had simply been found
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and convincing proof, that at the time he committed an offense, he did
not know that his actions were wrong.15 Mental disorder evidence is
inadmissible for the purpose of disproving mens rea unless a
defendant is pleading insanity, and mental disorder evidence that is
admissible but insufficient to meet the burden of proving insanity-
yet is sufficient to raise reasonable doubt about mens rea-simply has
no effect.16
That Arizona prohibits defendants from using mental disorder
evidence to raise reasonable doubt about mens rea means that the
prosecution's burden of proof is effectively lessened. While the jury
must still decide whether the prosecution's evidence proves the
elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
will make this decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence as
presented by the prosecution and not on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as challenged by the defense's evidence. 17 The Supreme
Court in Clark acknowledged that Arizona's rule potentially denies
criminal defendants the right to test the prosecution's case.' 8 But the
guilty:
If the finder of fact finds the defendant guilty except insane, the court shall determine
the sentence the defendant could have received . . . if the defendant had not been
found insane, and the judge shall sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration in
the state department of corrections and shall order the defendant to be placed under
the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board and committed to a state
mental health facility under the department of health services ... for that term.
Id.
5 Arizona's definition of insanity is purely cognitive, requiring a defendant to prove that
"at the time of the commission of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or
defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong." Clark, 548 U.S. at
744 (alterations in original) (quoting ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-502(A) (2001)).
16 See id. at 756-57 ("The state court held that testimony of a professional psychologist or
psychiatrist about a defendant's mental incapacity owing to mental disease or defect was
admissible, and could be considered, only for its bearing on an insanity defense; such evidence
could not be considered on the element of mens rea . . . .").
17 As the Supreme Court of Colorado has explained, "A rule precluding the defendant
from contesting the culpability element of the charge would render the prosecution's evidence
on that issue uncontestable as a matter of law, in derogation of the presumption of innocence
and the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982). In several cases, the United States
Supreme Court also has acknowledged that excluding a criminal defendant's evidence means
that jurors cannot properly evaluate the prosecution's evidence. See, e.g., Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006) ("[Bly evaluating the strength of only one party's evidence,
no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the
other side to rebut or cast doubt."); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ('The right to
offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms
the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as
the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.").
18 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 773-74 ("[It ... violates due process when the State impedes [a
criminal defendant] from using mental-disease and capacity evidence directly to rebut the
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Court seemed determined not to conclude that Arizona's rule is
unconstitutional, first characterizing the effect of the rule as the
"channeling" of evidence rather than the excluding of evidence,19 and
then finding that this "channeling" did not violate the defendant's
right to raise a reasonable doubt because Arizona has "good enough"
reasons for limiting the presentation of mental disorder evidence.2 0
Most states do not have special rules regarding criminal
defendants' presentation of mental disorder evidence.2 1 In these
states, defendants may offer mental disorder evidence for either or
both of two purposes: to prove insanity and to raise reasonable doubt
about mens rea. About a dozen states, however, have rules like
Arizona's-rules that prohibit criminal defendants from offering
mental disorder evidence to raise reasonable doubt about mens rea.22
The purpose of this Article is to review the scope of problems that
such rules cause. Part I of this Article presents an overview of Clark
v. Arizona, including a discussion of the evidence that the defendant
sought to present to raise reasonable doubt and of the trial court's
decision to exclude that evidence. Part H reviews the principles that
prosecution's evidence that he did form mens rea.").
19 See id. at 770.
20 See id. at 770-71 ("[Tlhe question is whether reasons for requiring [mental disorder
evidence] to be channeled and restricted are good enough to satisfy the standard of fundamental
fairness that due process requires. We think they are.").
21 See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 907 (8th ed. 2007) ("Most states do not impose special restrictions on
the use of mental health evidence to rebut a required mens rea.").
22 According to the U.S. Government's amicus brief in Clark, "At present, at least 14
jurisdictions and the federal government impose significant restrictions on the use of mental
health evidence in assessing mens rea." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 22, Clark, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 542415. As the government
recognized, though, some of these states prohibit only capacity evidence: "Some jurisdictions
prohibit the use of mental health evidence to negate the capacity to form the necessary mental
state but admit the evidence on the issue whether the defendant in fact formed the required
mental state." Id. at 23. Michigan law, for example, prohibits "evidence of a defendant's lack of
mental capacity short of legal insanity to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating
specific intent." People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Mich. 2001). As in Arizona,
however, courts in Michigan have failed to distinguish between evidence offered to prove
diminished capacity and evidence offered to prove actual lack of mens rea. As a consequence, a
defendant who wants to argue that the government has failed to prove mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt cannot use evidence of mental disorder to support this argument. "Rather, the
insanity defense as established by the Legislature is the sole standard for determining criminal
responsibility as it relates to mental illness or retardation." Id. at 285. Capacity evidence is
discussed in more detail infra note 31.
Four states no longer provide for a defense of insanity, effectively adopting the opposite of
Arizona's rule and allowing mental disorder evidence only for the purpose of disproving mens
rea. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207(3) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (2001); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-102 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2003). No state prohibits criminal
defendants from presenting mental disorder evidence for both purposes (proving insanity and
disproving mens rea).
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govern a criminal defendant's right to present evidence. As a general
rule, in our system of justice more evidence is preferred to less. This
preference is reflected in many federal and state rules of evidence and
in the constitutional limitations on the power to enact rules of
evidence that effectively deny criminal defendants a fair trial. Part
III focuses on mental disorder evidence, identifying two generally
helpful and trustworthy categories of evidence: evidence that presents
factual information about a mental illness and evidence that describes
a defendant's pre-offense history of a mental illness. Finally, Part IV
examines a defendant's right to raise reasonable doubt in relation to
states' rights to adopt a presumption of sanity and to define (or
redefine) elements of criminal offenses. The Article concludes that
because rules like Arizona's prohibit, for insufficient reasons,
criminal defendants from presenting evidence that is helpful and
trustworthy, such rules threaten the right to present a meaningful
defense.
I. CLARK V. ARIZONA
Eric Clark was charged with first-degree murder for shooting and
killing police officer Jeffrey Moritz.23 Clark conceded that he killed a
police officer but argued that he was not guilty of first-degree murder,
which requires that the killing of the officer have been intentional or
knowing, because at the time he shot Moritz, he believed Moritz
was an alien.24 Witnesses testifying for both the defense and the
prosecution agreed that Clark suffered from schizophrenia.25 Clark's
parents and friends reported that in the months preceding the
23 Clark, 548 U.S. at 743. The objective pieces of Clark are fairly simple:
In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police
responded in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music blaring was
circling a residential block. When he located the truck, the officer turned on the
emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car, which prompted petitioner Eric
Clark, the truck's driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol
car and told Clark to stay where he was. Less than a minute later, Clark shot the
officer, who died soon after but not before calling the police dispatcher for help.
Clark ran away on foot but was arrested later that day with gunpowder residue on his
hands; the gun that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap.
Id. It is the subjective piece-what was in Clark's mind at the time of the shooting-that is
difficult to ascertain.
24 See id. ("At trial, Clark did not contest the shooting and death, but relied on his
undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident in denying that he had the specific
intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge that he was doing so, as required by the
statute.").
25 See id. (referring to Clark's "undisputed schizophrenia"); id. at 776 (noting that "the
two testifying experts in this case . . . agree[d] that Clark was schizophrenic").
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shooting, Clark talked a great deal about people becoming aliens.26
They also reported that Clark's behavior had become increasingly
bizarre-he had strung wire across his bedroom to catch intruders, for
example, and he kept a bird in his car to detect airborne poisons.27
At his bench trial, Clark sought to introduce evidence of mental
disorder for the purpose of supporting two claims: the claim that
because Clark thought Moritz was an alien, he did not know that
shooting him was wrong;2 and the claim that because he thought
Moritz was an alien, he did not intentionally or knowingly shoot
a police officer.29 The trial judge allowed the evidence in support
of the affirmative defense of insanity but not in support of the
second defense,30 which Arizona regrettably3 1 calls the "defense of
26 See id. at 745 ("There was lay and expert testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was
populated with 'aliens' (some impersonating government agents), the 'aliens' were trying to kill
him, and bullets were the only way to stop them."); Petitioner's Opening Brief at 5, Clark, 126
S. Ct. 2709 (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 282168 (discussing Clark's "belief that the Earth had been
invaded by aliens, that Flagstaff was populated by aliens, that the aliens were trying to capture
and kill him, and that even his parents were aliens").
27 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 745 ("Witnesses testified, for example, that paranoid delusions led
Clark to rig a fishing line with beads and wind chimes at home to alert him to intrusion by
invaders, and to keep a bird in his automobile to warn of airborne poison."); Petitioner's
Opening Brief at 5, Clark, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 282168 ("He would not
sleep in his bedroom but retreated into the small computer room in his home, where he tied up a
fishing line with beads and wind chimes to alert him to intrusion by invaders. He later returned
to his room but equipped it with the same alarm apparatus." (footnote omitted)).
28 Clark, 548 U.S. at 744 ("[Clark] raised the affirmative defense of insanity, putting the
burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 'at the time of the commission
of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he]
did not know the criminal act was wrong."' (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (2001))).
29 Id. ("Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution's evidence of the requisite mens rea,
that he had acted intentionally or knowingly to kill a law enforcement officer.").
30 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 745 ("The trial court ruled that Clark could not rely on evidence
bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea."); see also I Joint Appendix at 9, Clark, 548 U.S.
735 (No. 05-5966) ("[R]ight now I'm bound by the [Arizona] supreme court decision in Mott
and we will be focusing, as far as I'm concerned, strictly on the insanity defense." (quoting
statement of trial judge)). An Arizona appellate court agreed with the trial judge's decision to
admit mental disorder evidence only for the purpose of proving insanity, stating that "the trial
court was bound by the [Arizona] supreme court's decision in Mott, which held that 'Arizona
does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an
affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime."' Arizona Court of Appeals
Memorandum Decision 44, 2 Joint Appendix at 352, Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (No. 05-5966)
(quoting State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)).
31 Arizona seems to characterize any defense other than insanity that relates to mental
disorder as a "diminished capacity defense." But what Arizona calls "diminished capacity" is
best understood as a kind of evidence that might support two very different defenses:
diminished responsibility, and what sometimes is called a failure of proof defense that really is
not an affirmative defense at all.
Diminished responsibility defense is a sort of imperfect insanity defense. See Richard A.
Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1250 n.183
(2007) ("The defense of diminished responsibility covers mental or emotional disturbances that
neither amount to insanity nor negate the defendant's mens rea. . . . [I]t often functions as a
'partial' defense, much like provocation, mitigating punishment or allowing conviction for a
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diminished capacity."32 In ruling that Clark could not present mental
disorder evidence in support of his claim that he did not intentionally
or knowingly kill a police officer, the trial judge determined that
Arizona law prohibits criminal defendants from presenting mental
disorder evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea. After
lesser-included offense."). A defendant who presents evidence for the purpose of proving that a
mental disorder impaired his ability to understand, or live up to, his legal obligations is arguing
that he is less culpable for his offense than would be someone who does not have a mental
disorder. See Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31
EMORY L.J. 9, 27 (1982) ("When a defendant offers a plea based on insanity, the issue is
whether he can be held criminally responsible for his acts. With diminished responsibility, the
issue is to what degree a person found guilty of such criminal act should be held responsible.").
This is how the Supreme Court in Clark seems to have understood Arizona's rule: "The
[Arizona] Supreme Court pointed out that the State had declined to adopt a defense of
diminished capacity (allowing a jury to decide when to excuse a defendant because of greater
than normal difficulty in conforming to the law)." Clark, 548 U.S. at 772.
A completely different argument, which Arizona also calls a diminished capacity defense,
is a defendant's claim that the prosecution has failed to prove the mens rea element of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim does not present an affirmative defense
like diminished responsibility. See United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 873 (7th Cir. 2007)
("Failure of proof 'defenses' do not provide an independent basis for escaping criminal liability,
but arise when a defendant introduces evidence that tends to show that the prosecution has
failed to prove some element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, such as
intent."); Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1984) ("[T]he mens rea variant of diminished capacity is not a separate
defense that deserves to be called 'diminished capacity' or any other name connoting that it is
some sort of special, affirmative defense."). It is instead simply the straightforward proposition
that the defendant is entitled to be found not guilty because the prosecution has failed to meet its
burden of proof. See Note, Feasibility and Admissibility of Mob Mentality Defenses, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1111, 1115-16 (1995) ("Unlike an excuse defense, which concedes that the offense has
been proven but argues that the defendant should be acquitted nonetheless, a failure-of-proof
defense argues that the prosecution cannot prove some essential element of the crime.").
32 Clark, 548 U.S. at 772 (noting that "[t]he State Supreme Court pointed out that the
State had declined to adopt a defense of diminished capacity").
33 The source of this rule is the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mott, 931
P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc). See Clark, 548 U.S. at 745 ("The [trial] court cited
State v. Mott, which 'refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent,' and held
that 'Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity . . . to
negate the mens rea element of a crime."' (omission in original) (citations omitted)). In Mott, a
jury found Shelly Mott guilty of felony child abuse and first-degree felony murder after she
failed to obtain medical care for her two-year-old daughter, who had received a fatal head injury
while in the care of Mott's boyfriend. See Mott, 931 P.2d at 1048-49. At trial, Mott sought to
present expert testimony about battered women's syndrome as a part of her defense. Id. at 1049.
The trial court ruled that such evidence was inadmissible because it was "an attempt to prove
defendant's diminished capacity." Id. at 1048. Mott's purpose seeking to present battered
women's syndrome evidence was not entirely clear. When the Arizona Supreme Court
considered the case, the majority firmly believed that Mott's purpose was to prove that she
lacked the capacity to intentionally or knowingly fail to obtain medical care for her child. See id.
at 1049. The dissent, though, was equally convinced that Mott's purpose was not to argue
diminished capacity-that is, to argue that she lacked the capacity to act with a certain mens
rea-but instead to argue that she in fact lacked the specified mens rea. See id. at 1061
(Feldman, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority takes the inconsistent position that use of psychiatric
evidence to negate mens rea is the same as an attempt to prove diminished capacity."). A federal
district court eventually agreed with the dissent and granted habeas relief to Mott, ruling that
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finding that Clark had not proven insanity by clear and convincing
evidence, the trial judge ruled that Clark was guilty of first-degree
murder for intentionally or knowingly killing a police officer.34
Clark is an unusual case because Clark's "diminished capacity
defense" overlapped with his insanity defense.35 If Clark's insanity
defense had succeeded, it would have been because the judge, as
fact-finder, concluded that Clark did not know that what he was doing
was wrong-that is, that Clark believed that he was shooting an alien
and not a police officer. It is possible to think that because Clark's
insanity defense did not succeed, his "diminished capacity defense"
could not have succeeded either. Clark was able to present lay and
expert testimony about his mental illness in support of an insanity
defense, so whatever evidence Clark was unable to present in support
of his "diminished capacity defense" did not alter the outcome of his
trial.36 Even if the judge had considered the mental disorder evidence
in support of Clark's "diminished capacity defense," the result could
not have been any different, because for the "diminished capacity
Mott had offered evidence of battered women's syndrome "to (1) provide an alternative
explanation for her conduct and (2) negate the state's evidence that she acted intentionally
or knowingly in failing to protect her child." Mott v. Stewart, No. 98-CV-239, 2002 WL
31017646, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2002).
Despite the federal court's grant of habeas relief, Arizona courts continue to cite Mott as
the source of the rule that Arizona does not allow defendants to present mental disorder
evidence in support of a "diminished capacity" defense-that is, in support of any defense
that is not insanity. See, e.g., Moormann v. Schriro, No. CV-91-1121-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL
2705146, at *11 (D. Ariz. Jul. 8, 2008); West v. Schriro, No. CV-98-218-TUC-DCB, 2007 WL
4240859, at *7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007); Runningeagle v. Schriro, No. CV-98-1903-PHX-PGR,
2007 WL 4200743, at *I1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2007); Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX
-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220, at *10 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007); Stanley v. Schriro, No. CV-98
-0430-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2816541, at *24 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2006), affd in part & rev'd in
part, No. 06-99009, 2010 WL 816940 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2010).
34 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 746 ("The judge ... issued a special verdict of first-degree
murder, expressly finding that Clark shot and caused the death of Officer Moritz beyond a
reasonable doubt and that Clark had not shown that he was insane at the time.").
35 See Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1120
(2007) ("Note that if Clark were believed, he would be the rarest of the rare, a defendant whose
severe mental disorder both produced a belief entirely inconsistent with a subjective mens rea
on that occasion and undermined his general capacity for rationality.").
36 Peter Westen, for example, has suggested that Arizona did not prohibit Clark from
presenting any evidence. See Peter Westen, The Supreme Court's Bout with Insanity: Clark v.
Arizona, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 151 (2006) ("If the judge had concluded that Clark had
shown, by clear and convincing evidence that he thought he was shooting an alien rather than a
human being, the judge would have acquitted Clark on the grounds, inter alia, that, despite his
having killed a policeman, Clark did not 'know' he was killing a policeman."). In addition, the
United States argued in an amicus brief that Clark would have met the requirement for insanity
if he were "so incapable of forming intent or knowledge that he did not know the wrongfulness
of his act." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27, Clark,
548 U.S. 735 (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 542415.
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defense" to have succeeded, the judge would have had to conclude
that Clark did not know that he was shooting a police officer-the
very conclusion the judge rejected in deciding that Clark was not
insane.
The problem with this analysis is that it overlooks the two
defenses' different burdens of proof. In order to be found insane,
Clark needed to present clear and convincing evidence that at the time
he shot Officer Moritz, he believed the officer was an alien. In order
to be found not guilty because the prosecution did not prove the mens
rea element of "intentionally or knowingly" beyond a reasonable
doubt, Clark needed only to present evidence that was sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt.38 The trial court's guilty verdict says that
Clark did not present clear and convincing evidence, but the verdict
does not say anything at all about whether Clark's evidence would
have created reasonable doubt had he been allowed to present it for
that purpose.
Arizona's law allowing criminal defendants to present mental
disorder evidence only for the purpose of proving insanity is contrary
to the most basic principles of our system of justice. It prohibits
criminal defendants from presenting a whole category of important
evidence, while imposing no similar prohibition on the prosecution.
And it lessens the prosecution's burden of proof by limiting the
defendant's ability to challenge the prosecution's evidence, thereby
denying the defendant the right to be found guilty of a crime only
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. THE RIGHT TO RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT
A. In re Winship: The Reasonable Doubt Rule
Although the precise origins are unclear, the roots of the rule that
criminal convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt extend
back at least several centuries.3 9 Some trace the rule back to 1798 and
defense attorneys' success in raising the prosecution's burden of
proof in the Irish Treason Cases. 40 Others believe that the rule was
37 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (presenting Arizona's definition of insanity).
38 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 773 (observing that "if the ... evidence ... shows it was at least
doubtful that [the defendant] could form mens rea, then he should not be found guilty in the first
place").
3 See Langbein, supra note 6, at 1070 ("[T]owards the end of the eighteenth century the
presumption of innocence-the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof-was formulated.").
4 See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, Whose Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering the Appropriate
Role of the Reviewing Court in the Criminal Decision Making Process, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
911, 913 (1987) ("It is generally believed that the reasonable doubt standard, as such, first
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introduced even earlier, for the purpose of lessening the prosecution's
burden of proof, when "blood punishments" were common and jurors
were hesitant to convict on less than proof beyond all doubt.4'
In this country, the Supreme Court recognized the reasonable
doubt rule as a constitutional requirement in 1970. In re Winship42
involved a proceeding for determining whether a juvenile was
a "delinquent" under a New York law that allowed such a
determination to be based on a preponderance of the evidence.43
Following its earlier decision in In re Gault," which had held that
juvenile proceedings must comply with "the essentials of due process
and fair treatment,"AS the Supreme Court in Winship ruled that
"juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt when they are charged with violation of a criminal
law."
Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases
promotes several important values of our system of justice. The
reasonable doubt rule reflects the determination that convicting
someone who is innocent is much worse that not convicting someone
who is guilty.4 7 The rule also gives meaning to the presumption of
innocence4 8 and helps to ensure that those who are convicted deserve
surfaced in 1798 in the Irish Treason cases, wherein defense counsel argued that 'if the
jury entertain a reasonable doubt upon the truth of the testimony of witnesses given upon the
issue ... they are bound' to acquit." (omission in original) (footnote omitted)); Jon 0. Newman,
Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 981-82 (1993) ("Most believe that the
'reasonable doubt' standard was first urged upon courts in the Irish Treason Cases in 1798 by
defense lawyers who were endeavoring to raise the prosecution's burden of persuasion."
(footnote omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 40, at 982 ("[T]here is a competing view that the
[beyond a reasonable doubt] standard was urged by prosecutors who were trying to lower their
burden of persuasion from an often unattainable task of having to persuade the jury beyond all
doubt."); Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 55 B.U. L. REv. 507, 511 (1975) (proposing that before adoption of the reasonable doubt
rule, the prosecution's burden of proof "closely approximated absolute certainty-jurors were to
acquit if they had any doubts"). See also generally JAMES Q. WHYTMAN, THE ORIGINS OF
REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008).
42 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
43 Id. at 359-60.
- 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
45 Id. at 30.
6 Winship, 397 U.S. at 365.
47 See id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.").
48 See id. at 363 (majority opinion) ("The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose
'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' (quoting Coffin
v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))); see also Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt
Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) [hereinafter Sundby,
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to be punished. 49 And because the reasonable doubt rule accords with
our general sense of the protections that should be provided to
criminal defendants, the rule enhances the perceived legitimacy of the
criminal justice system.o
B. A Preference for Admissibility
1. The Rules of Evidence
Juries are our legal system's fact-finders and ultimate decision
makers." Of course, juries need evidence to assess facts accurately
and to reach just decisions, and if too much evidence is excluded,
juries cannot properly do their job. Rules that make evidence
inadmissible are inconsistent with our adversarial system's" basic
The Reasonable Doubt Rule] ("In the criminal trial setting, the presumption of innocence is
given vitality primarily through the requirement that the government prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
49 See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1339 (1977) ("Because the criminal sanction is an
especially serious matter for both the defendant and the community, it is especially important to
ensure that it is imposed only on a defendant who has forfeited his right to be free from
punishment.").
5 See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1979) ("The strategy of the system is to seek the
observers' acceptance of the jury as a surrogate decisionmaker, trusted because it is understood
to be an impartial, responsible, and representative body, operating in a fair and structured
system and deciding according to an exceedingly strict standard of guilt."); see also Winship,
397 U.S. at 364 ("It is ... important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty."); Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("It is the duty of the
Government to establish [a defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion-basic in
our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due
process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process."').
51 See United States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The
jury, as fact finder, has discretion to resolve all conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence, and
draw inferences from the basic facts to the ultimate facts.").
52 See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918) ("[T]he truth is more likely to
be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem
to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such
testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court . . . ."); 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 490 (Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1978) (1827) ("Evidence is the basis of
justice: to exclude evidence is to exclude justice."); Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth
and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1138
(1987) ("Our legal system presupposes that accuracy of fact-finding is usually proportionate to
the amount of relevant evidence considered . . . .").
53 The adversarial system itself, with its skewed allocation of resources between the
defendant and the government, is another reason to allow defendants to present evidence that
might establish a reasonable doubt regarding an element of the charged offense. See Morse,
supra note 31, at 16 ("Prohibiting the defendant from offering probative evidence to defeat the
prosecution's prima facie case for any crime seems grossly unjust in an adversary system in
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operating principle that the best way to arrive at the truth-or at least
at a decision that the participants and the public can accept -is to
allow both parties to present their own evidence and to challenge the
evidence presented by the opposing party.
The Federal Rules of Evidence-which have influenced most if
not all states' rules of evidence 56-- begin with the premise, presented
in Rule 402, that all relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 401
defines relevance exceptionally broadly, so that evidence is irrelevant
only if it does not have "any tendency" at all to prove or disprove a
fact that could make a difference in the jury's decision. The Rules
do preclude certain categories of evidence, such as hearsay59 and
which the state has such powerful resources compared to most defendants."); Amy Sinden, In
Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1405, 1463 (2005) ("The power imbalance between the individual and the state is perhaps
nowhere more vividly and palpably on display than in a criminal proceeding, where 'the
awesome power' and 'virtually limitless resources' of the state are pitted against the individual
criminal defendant." (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring))).
5 See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair
Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1037-40 (1987) (discussing the goals served by criminal trials,
including both truth and "fair play").
5 See sources cited supra note 52; see also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the
Admissibility ofExperts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 195 (2003) ("[A] justificatory premise of
the adversary system is that the clash of opposing, relevant evidence will yield accurate results,
at least frequently enough to render that system superior to the alternatives."); id. at 195 ("[T]he
system encourages parties to present all relevant evidence that is reasonably available and not
too weak to be of practical use, each side in the dispute having an incentive to present that
which is significant and favorable.").
56 See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 2-3 (2d ed. 2008) ("At last count, forty-two states and
Puerto Rico have adopted the Federal Rules in whole or in great part. Even those eight states
that have adopted distinct evidence codes or have not codified their evidence law-California,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York and Virginia-adhere to similar evidence
principles."); Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1488
(2005) ("As of 2004, forty-one states have adopted various versions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence."). The desire to create uniformity among federal and state rules of evidence was one
of the driving forces behind the development of the Federal Rules. See Michael Ariens,
Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence, 17 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 213, 245-47 (1992).
5 FED. R. EvtD. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."). Arizona's rule is nearly
identical to the federal rule: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of Arizona or by applicable statutes
or rules." ARIZ. R. EVID. 402. The federal rules take a similar approach regarding the
admissibility of opinion testimony. See Fed. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note ("The
basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the
trier of fact.").
58 See FED. R. EvtD. 401 (defining relevant evidence to be "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence").
5 See FED. R. EVtD. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
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character evidence,6 as especially untrustworthy. 61 But the Rules also
provide for numerous exceptions to these exclusions, for evidence
that possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" despite
belonging to an untrustworthy category.62 Rule 803, for example, lists
twenty-three exceptions to the rule that hearsay is inadmissible. 63
Another rule that embodies the preference for admitting evidence
is Rule 403, which embraces the Rules' presumption in favor of
admitting relevant evidence6 and sets a high standard for overcoming
that presumption on the basis of such risks as causing unfair
65prejudice, confusing the jury, or wasting the court's resources.
Relevant evidence may be excluded under this rule only if the risk
Congress.").
6 See FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (providing that, with three narrow exceptions, "[e]vidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion"); FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith.").
61 This Article uses the term "untrustworthy" to refer to evidence that is likely to lead a
jury to render an unsound verdict. In large part, our rules of evidence are intended to
systematically restrict untrustworthy evidence-the rule against hearsay and the rule against
character evidence, for example, both have been explained as minimizing the risk that jurors
will make decisions on the basis of evidence that is false or misleading. See Fleming James, Jr.
& John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 792 n. 103
(1950) ("In the eyes of the law, the inferences which might be drawn from evidence of character
or reputation of the parties are too vague, uncertain and unreliable to be worthy of consideration
in determining the merits, however just and reasonable such inferences may seem to the lay
mind." (quoting I JONEs, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 148 (4th ed. 1938)); Laurence H. Tribe,
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) ("The basic hearsay problem is that
of forging a reliable chain of inferences, from an act or utterance of a person not subject to
contemporaneous in-court cross-examination about that act or utterance, to an event that the act
or utterance is supposed to reflect."). Most legal commentators use the term "reliable" to mean
what this Article means by trustworthy. See Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against
Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and the Law with Justice Breyer at
the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1067 n.192 (2001) ("Evidence is reliable if it has sufficient
indicia of trustworthiness to be presented to the jury for its consideration."). "Reliable" is an
unfortunate legal term because it carries a different meaning in the realm of science. In
particular, "reliable" as a legal term means what both "reliable" and "valid" mean as scientific
terms. See infra note 143 (discussing validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnoses).
62 FED. R. EVID. art. Vm advisory committee's note ("The solution evolved by the
common law has been a general rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous exceptions
under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness.").
63 FED. R. EVID. 803; see also FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing five exceptions to the hearsay
rule); FED. R. EVID. 807 (providing a residual exception for "[a] statement not specifically
covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness").
64 See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 241 (7th ed. 1998) ("[T]here is a presumption in favor of
admitting relevant evidence.").
65 Rule 403 provides that "[ajlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
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"substantially outweighs" the evidence's probative value.66 Thus, ties
or close cases are resolved in favor of admitting the evidence;67 only
in very clear cases should the evidence be excluded.68
2. The Constitution
In addition to our adversarial system's general preference for more
rather than less evidence, rights granted under the Constitution create
special preferences for allowing criminal defendants to present
evidence. 6 9 For example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants
the right to call witnesses on their own behalf,70 while the Fifth
Amendment implicitly guarantees defendants the right to testify in
their own defense.'
The Supreme Court has also found that the Due Process Clause
implies additional rights. For example, one requirement of due
process is that "criminal prosecutions must comport with
prevailing notions of fundamental fairness." 72 The Supreme Court
has interpreted "fundamental fairness" as requiring that "criminal
defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense."
6 Id.
67 See United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[W]here the reviewing
court finds the balancing close, Rule 403 tilts the balance in favor of admission."); 1
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 64, at 241 ("[Tlhe policy of [Rule 403] is that if the balance
between probative value and countervailing factors is close, the Judge should admit the
evidence.").
68 See United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that "exclusion
of evidence under Rule 403 that is otherwise admissible under the other rules 'is an
extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly."' (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 192
F.3d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1999))).
69 There are several reasons for these preferences. One important reason is that the
government has vastly more resources than do virtually all defendants. See sources cited supra
note 53.
7o U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... ).
71 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (noting that "[t]he opportunity to testify
is . .. a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony").
72 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 76 (1985) (recognizing "the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness"); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ("As applied to a criminal trial,
denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice.").
73 Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485; see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324
(2006) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in
the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."'
(quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986))); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ("Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for
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In Clark, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the right to raise
reasonable doubt is part of the due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness: "[I]t . . . violates due process when the State impedes [a
defendant] from using mental-disease and capacity evidence directly
to rebut the prosecution's evidence that he did form mens rea.
Accordingly, a defendant who has been prohibited from presenting
evidence for the purpose of challenging the prosecution's case has at
least potentially been denied the right to a fundamentally fair trial. 75
Of course, like all rights, the right to present evidence for the
purpose of raising reasonable doubt is not absolute.76 On the
other hand, due process requires the government to have valid,
proportionate, non-arbitrary reasons for excluding a criminal
defendant's evidence.77 For example, the Supreme Court recently
ruled in Holmes v. South Carolina78 that the state violated the
defendant's due process right to present a meaningful defense by
prohibiting him from introducing evidence for the purpose of proving
that someone else had committed the charged offense. 79 The Court
the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to
establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.").
74 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 773-74 (2006). The Court further explained:
An insanity rule gives a defendant already found guilty the opportunity to excuse his
conduct by showing he was insane when he acted, that is, that he did not have the
mental capacity for conventional guilt and criminal responsibility. But, as the dissent
argues, if the same evidence that affirmatively shows he was not guilty by reason of
insanity ... also shows it was at least doubtful that he could form mens rea, then he
should not be found guilty in the first place; it thus violates due process when the
State impedes him from using mental-disease and capacity evidence directly to rebut
the prosecution's evidence that he did form mens rea.
Id.
75 See United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 901 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[A] rule barring
evidence on the issue of mens rea may be unconstitutional so long as we determine criminal
liability in part through subjective states of mind.").
76 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 90 (1989) ("Because no constitutional rights are absolute,
virtually every constitutional case involves the question whether the government's action is
justified by a sufficient purpose.").
77 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) ("[R]ules excluding evidence
from criminal trials ... do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are
not 'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."' (quoting Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987))); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (stating that "the principle [is] that the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited
by the State for a 'valid' reason"); id. at 63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[While States have the
power to exclude evidence through evidentiary rules that serve the interests of fairness and
reliability, limitations on evidence may exceed the bounds of due process where such limitations
undermine a defendant's ability to present exculpatory evidence without serving a valid state
justification.").
78 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
7 Id. at 330-31.
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determined that the exclusion of the defendant's evidence was
arbitrary because the trial court had reached its decision to exclude by
considering only the strength of the prosecution's case, not by
considering the strength of the prosecution's case as challenged by
the defendant's evidence: "[I]n evaluating the prosecution's forensic
evidence and deeming it to be 'strong'-and thereby justifying
exclusion of petitioner's third-party guilt evidence-the South
Carolina Supreme Court made no mention of the defense challenges
to the prosecution's evidence."8 0
Additionally, decisions to exclude a criminal defendant's evidence
should generally be made on a case-by-case basis rather than on a
categorical basis.81 In several cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the "wholesale" exclusion of certain categories of defense evidence
is unconstitutional. For example, in Crane v. Kentucky, 82 a case in
which the state court prohibited the defendant from presenting
evidence for the purpose of proving that his confession was
unreliable,83 the Court found that there was no "rational justification
for the wholesale exclusion of this body of potentially exculpatory
evidence."84 Similarly, in Washington v. Texas, 5 a state statute
rendered inadmissible the testimony of the defendant's accomplice.86
The Court ruled that the state had inappropriately "prevent[ed] whole
categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori
categories that presume them unworthy of belief."87 And in Rock v.
Arkansas,88 the state prohibited the defendant from testifying after
she had been hypnotized.89 The Court held that "[w]holesale
inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction
on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State
repudiating the validity of all post-hypnosis recollections." 90 The
lesson of these cases is that even though some accomplice testimony
or hypnotically refreshed testimony (or any other category of
evidence) might be untrustworthy, a rule that categorically prohibits
s0 Id. at 329.
81 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (finding that the trial court
improperly excluded the defendant's evidence, in pan because the exclusion was based on "a
priori categories that presume [certain kinds of evidence] unworthy of belief'); see also
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (ruling that the trial court erred in
"mechanistically" excluding the defendant's evidence under the rule against hearsay).
82 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
83 Id. at 684.
8 Id. at 691.
85 388 U.S. 14.
86 See id. at 16-17.
87 Id. at 22.
88 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
89 See id. at 46-47.
9 Id. at 61.
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criminal defendants from presenting such evidence is not justified
unless the evidence is always untrustworthy.91
3. Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants
Rules that exclude criminal defendants' evidence of mental
disorder are particularly burdensome because a defendant's mental
state is potentially at issue in almost every criminal case. Aside from
a few kinds of strict liability crimes, which are generally disfavored,92
a crime is defined as an actus reus and a mens rea-a guilty act and a
guilty mind.9 3 In almost every criminal trial, then, the jury must reach
a conclusion about the defendant's mental state at the time of the
offense. Given the importance of the jury's conclusions about the
defendant's mental state, it is not surprising that defendants have
called upon psychiatrists and other mental health experts to testify on
their behalf.94
Criminal defendants' use of mental disorder evidence has
generated a large amount of controversy. As courts, commentators,
and even psychiatrists themselves have pointed out, psychiatry
is an "inexact science."9 6 But even assuming that psychiatry is
91 See id. (ruling that evidence should not be categorically excluded unless it "is always so
untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should
disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on trial").
9 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (observing that "offenses that
require no mens rea generally are disfavored"); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426
(1985) ("[C]riminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a 'generally disfavored status."'
(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978))); Gypsum, 438 U.S. at
436 (noting the "familiar proposition that '[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."' (quoting
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (plurality opinion))).
93 See Gerald S. Reamey, The Growing Role of Fortuity in Texas Criminal Law, 47 S.
TEx. L. REv. 59, 59-60 (2005) ("Criminal responsibility usually attaches only when mens rea
combines with volitional conduct-or the withholding of some required act-to produce a
public harm. These component parts of criminal responsibility are widely accepted and utilized
to define what is a 'crime."' (footnote omitted)).
9 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985) ("[W]hen the State has made the
defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might
suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal
his defense."); Peter R. Dahl, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of Psychiatric
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 73 CAL. L. REv. 411, 414 (1985) ("To the extent that the law is
concerned with the mental state and the motivations of the wrongdoer, it makes sense to use
psychiatry to advance the inquiry.").
9 See JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 37 (5th
ed. 1995) ("Forensic psychiatry is a field that is long on controversy and short on data."
(internal quotation marks omitted)), quoted in Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and
Discredited Plaintiff Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOzO L. REv. 749, 766
n.85 (2010).
96 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81 ("Psychiatry is not, however, an exact science. . . ."); Rael Jean
Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Subverting Good Intentions: A Brief History of Mental Health
"Reform," 2 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL'Y 89, 105 (1992) ("Organized psychiatry endorsed its
2010] RIGHT TO RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT 663
meaningfully less exact than other medical sciences,97 the proper way
to deal with the inexactness of psychiatry is not to ban all mental
disorder evidence.9 8 Such a ban not only is contrary to the general
preference for evidence, 99 it also can deny criminal defendants the
right, as guaranteed under the Constitution, to present a meaningful
defense.1  Instead, the solution should be to help courts separate the
helpful, trustworthy evidence from the unhelpful or untrustworthy
evidence. And contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion in Clark v.
Arizona, some kinds of mental disorder evidence are indeed generally
helpful as well as trustworthy.
III. MENTAL DISORDER EVIDENCE: IDENTIFYING THE HELPFUL AND
THE TRUSTWORTHY
Mental disorder evidence has been criticized in a variety of ways.
Expert psychiatric testimony is subject to the criticisms of expert
evidence in general,101 including the arguments that jurors will place
undue weight on the testimony of someone that the court calls an
"expert"1 02 and that experts are nothing more than "hired guns." 10 3
critics' claim that psychiatrists were unable to predict violence and advised its members to avoid
such predictions.").
9 Some commentators disagree that psychiatry should be singled out as an especially
inexact medical science. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo's Nest: Why Do
Courts Continue to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REv. 987, 993
(2002) ("The description of psychiatry as an inexact science is a meaningless distinction; none
of the medical sciences are 'exact' in the same manner as mathematics.").
98 See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 35, at 1084 ("Healthy skepticism about mental
disorder and the potential relation between it and criminal responsibility, especially in marginal
cases, is warranted; outright rejection is not.").
9 See source cited supra note 64 and accompanying text.
1oo See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
1o1 See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1997) [hereinafter Sundby,
The Jury as Critic] ("If one wants to spark a debate, few flints are as effective as the issue of
expert witnesses and their proper role.").
i0 See John W. Osborne, Note, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 501 (noting some courts' concerns that juries "may be
overly impressed by experts with seemingly impressive credentials" and "may give too much
weight to expert opinions because, by being designated 'scientific,' the opinions may take on a
mystical aura of infallibility" (footnote omitted)).
103 Daniel C. Murrie et al., Does Interrater (Dis)agreement on Psychopathy Checklist
Scores in Sexually Violent Predator Trials Suggest Partisan Allegiance in Forensic
Evaluations?, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 352, 360 (2008) ("[The lay public has expressed
concern that at least some forensic psychologists tend to be 'hired guns' who predictably reach
only opinions that support the party who retained their services." (citation omitted)); cf. Steven
K. Erickson, Mind over Morality, 54 BuFF. L. REv. 1555, 1561 (2007) (reviewing CHARLES
PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL (2006)) (discussing the Patty Hearst
case-including "an expert whose own published works directly contradicted his testimony"-
and suggesting that "[in this case, experts seem to deserve their reputation as 'hired guns"').
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Additionally, critics of mental disorder evidence have alleged that this
type of evidence is unnecessary or misleading at best and "junk
science" or "psychobabble" at worst.'0
The Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on such criticisms in
Clark v. Arizona. 05 In Clark, the Court upheld Arizona's rule
that prohibits defendants from presenting evidence of mental disorder
for the purpose of disproving mens rea because the Court agreed
with what it supposed were Arizona's reasons for prohibiting
this evidence.1 06 But the Court gave Arizona's rule too much benefit
of the doubt. The constitutional test is not whether some mental
disorder evidence is untrustworthy, or even whether mental disorder
evidence in general is untrustworthy, but whether all mental disorder
evidence is so untrustworthy as to justify a total ban on such
evidence, given a criminal defendant's countervailing right to a
fundamentally fair trial.107 Unless all mental disorder evidence is in
all cases untrustworthy, categorically prohibiting criminal defendants
from presenting this evidence risks violating defendants' due process
right to present a meaningful defense-in particular, to raise
reasonable doubt about the mens rea element of a charged offense. 0 8
A. Reconsidering Clark v. Arizona
1. The Right to Raise Reasonable Doubt Recognized
In Clark, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Clark had a due
process right to present mental disorder evidence to raise reasonable
doubt about the mens rea element of first-degree murder.' The Court
further noted, however, that "the right to introduce relevant evidence
can be curtailed if there is a good reason for doing that.""o A key
1"4 See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS,
SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994); CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF
VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1992); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL
JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997).
os 548 U.S. 735, 778 (2006) (calling Arizona's reasons for prohibiting criminal defendants
from presenting mental disorder evidence except in support of an insanity defense "sensible");
id. at 770 ("good enough").
10 See id. at 774 (finding that there are "characteristics of mental-disease and capacity
evidence giving rise to risks that may reasonably be hedged by channeling the consideration of
such evidence to the insanity issue on which, in States like Arizona, a defendant has the burden
of persuasion").
"See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing constitutional limits on states' authority to
enact rules excluding criminal defendants' evidence).
10 See sources cited supra note 77 (establishing the rule that exclusions of defense
evidence must not be disproportionate to the purpose served by exclusion).
10 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
I0 Clark, 548 U.S. at 770; see also supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text (discussing
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ruling in Clark, then, is the Court's conclusion that Arizona had
"good enough" reasons for prohibiting Clark from presenting mental
disorder evidence for the purpose of proving that although he did kill
a police officer, he did not do so intentionally or knowingly.'"
2. The Court's Categories of Evidence
Before evaluating Arizona's reasons for excluding Clark's
evidence, the Court divided the world of mental disorder evidence
into three categories: observation evidence, mental disease evidence,
and diminished capacity evidence.112 Why the Court did this is a
mystery. The Court suggested that it created these divisions because
Clark had not objected to the trial court's exclusion of some
categories of evidence.' 13 But before the Court invented them, these
categories did not exist, so why the Court would expect Clark to have
objected to each of the categories is, again, a mystery. 1 14 This Article
largely ignores these invented categories because they appear
nowhere else in the law,' 15 because they do not capture all of the
kinds of mental disorder evidence that a criminal defendant might
want to present,1 16 and because it is quite clear that the trial judge in
Clark interpreted Arizona state law as prohibiting Clark from
presenting any kind of mental disorder evidence for the purpose of
raising reasonable doubt about mens rea.11
the constitutional standard for allowing exclusion of defendant's evidence).
"'See Clark, 548 U.S. at 770-71 ("[T]he question is whether reasons for requiring
[mental-disease and capacity evidence] to be channeled and restricted are good enough to satisfy
the standard of fundamental fairness that due process requires. We think they are.").
"
2 See id. at 757-58. The Court observed that "[u]nderstanding Clark's claim requires
attention to the [three] categories of evidence with a potential bearing on mens rea." Id. at 757.
113 See id. at 762 (noting that Clark did not "apprise the Arizona courts that he believed the
trial judge had erroneously limited the consideration of observation evidence").
"
4 See id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Seizing upon a theory invented here by the
Court itself, the Court narrows Clark's claim so he cannot raise the point everyone else thought
was involved in the case."); see also Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished
Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 7, 82 (2007) ("Having unnecessarily created these three confusing and misleading
categories of behavioral evidence, the Court construed Clark's due process challenge to Mott as
being one limited to its prohibition on mental disease evidence from being used to establish
diminished capacity."); Westen, supra note 36, at 162 ("The Court not only fashioned this
constitutional distinction out of whole cloth, but also failed to explain what motivated it.").
"
5 See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 35, at 1103 ("This classification was not part of
Arizona law (or any state law we know about) and cannot be found in any Supreme Court
precedent.").
"
6 See Clark, 548 U.S.at 781-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("This restructured evidentiary
universe, with no convincing authority to support it, is unworkable on its own terms... . These
categories break down quickly when it is understood how the testimony would apply to the
question of intent and knowledge at issue here.").
"
7 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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3. The Court's Assessment of Mental Disorder Evidence
The Court offered three reasons that it considered "good enough"
to justify Arizona's decision to prohibit a criminal defendant from
presenting mental disorder evidence for the purpose of disproving
mens rea: some mental disorder diagnoses are not generally
accepted;"' 8 expert testimony about mental disorder can potentially
mislead jurors;" 9 and diminished capacity evidence is particularly
untrustworthy.12 0
Each of these reasons is (to begin with) facially problematic. First,
that some mental disorder diagnoses are not generally accepted does
not mean that no mental disorder diagnoses are generally accepted.
Schizophrenia is such a generally accepted diagnosis.121 In Clark
itself, for example, no one disputed that Clark was properly diagnosed
with schizophrenia.122
Second, the possibility that expert testimony will mislead jurors is
not unique to expert testimony about mental disorders. The Court's
analysis is particularly frustrating here: the Court suggested that
because jurors might hear testimony of two experts who disagree with
each other, expert psychiatric testimony can "easily mislead"
jurors.123 But experts disagree in all kinds of cases.' 24 Moreover, the
Ius Clark, 548 U.S. at 774-75 (discussing "professional ferment" regarding diagnoses).
119Id. at 775 (discussing "the potential of mental-disease evidence to mislead jurors").
120 Id. at 776 (discussing the "particular risks inherent in the opinions of the experts who
supplement the mental-disease classifications with opinions on incapacity").
121 Schizophrenia, the mental disorder at issue in Clark, is among the most generally
accepted of mental disorder diagnoses. See MARVIN I. HERZ & STEPHEN R. MARDER,
SCHIZOPHRENIA: COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17 (2002) ("The recent
discoveries in schizophrenia have not uncovered the cause of this illness. However, they have
reinforced a consistent view of the disorder."); see also Heather M. Conklin & William G.
Iacono, Assessment of Schizophrenia: Getting Closer to the Cause, 29 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
405, 409 (2003) ("When we talk of the changing face of schizophrenia we are referring to its
packaging rather than its core, which has changed little over the past century.").
1 22 See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Clark, 548 U.S. at 746 ("The [trial]
judge noted that . . . Clark was indisputably afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia at the time
of the shooting . . . ."); Petitioner's Opening Brief at 3-4, Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (No. 05-5966),
2006 WL 282168 ("There was also no dispute that at the time of the episode Eric was suffering
from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and was actively psychotic. The prosecution conceded
these facts; and the prosecution's expert forensic psychologist diagnosed it independently of, but
in conformity with, the defense expert psychiatrist.").
123 Clark, 548 U.S. at 776. The Court reasoned:
The limits of the utility of a professional disease diagnosis are evident in the dispute
between the two testifying experts in this case; they agree that Clark was
schizophrenic, but they come to opposite conclusions on whether the mental disease
in his particular case left him bereft of cognitive or moral capacity. Evidence of
mental disease, then, can easily mislead ....
Id.
124 See United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The mere fact that there
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Court said nothing about why expert psychiatric testimony is too
untrustworthy to be admitted by a defendant in a criminal trial, yet is
trustworthy enough to be admitted by the prosecution in a criminal
trial--or by any other kind of litigant in any other kind of case.125 The
Court did explain that expert testimony about mental disorders can
mislead jurors "because of the imperfect fit between the questions of
ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical
diagnosis,"1 26 but this explanation, if taken to its logical conclusion,
would bar all expert testimony except that offered by witnesses who
are experts on the law.
Finally, what the Court says about diminished capacity evidence is
likely true. This kind of evidence, understood in its proper, narrow
sense, 127 probably is particularly untrustworthy. 12 8 But Arizona's
rule goes far beyond excluding evidence of diminished capacity.
Arizona's rule bars all evidence (or even in the Court's reclassified
world of evidence, nearly all evidence 29) of mental disorder for the
purpose disproving mens rea.130 Such a rule is overly burdensome,
excluding much more evidence than is necessary for achieving the
goal of admitting only mental disorder evidence that is helpful and
may be conflicting testimony by experts is not a sufficient basis to exclude such evidence.
Indeed, not uncommonly, there is conflict among experts on most any subject."); Robitscher &
Haynes, supra note 31, at 44 ("[A]ll court proceedings involve contradictory testimony.").
125 See Morse, supra note 31, at 10 ("Although I am generally in sympathy with claims
about the inexactness of mental health testimony, its exclusion on the issue of mens rea is
insupportable given the present law of evidence. Mental health testimony is broadly admissible
everywhere to help assess mental states in many criminal and civil law contexts." (footnote
omitted)); Morse & Hoffman, supra note 35, at 1108 ("[Tlhere is no reason a state's skepticism
about psychiatric evidence should begin and end with the criminal law.").
Indeed, when the question was whether juries could properly consider expert psychiatric
evidence presented by the government, the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion and
found that juries are capable of making sense of this evidence: "We are not persuaded that such
testimony is almost entirely unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not
be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings." Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
(2006), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). Richard Nagareda has
argued persuasively that evidentiary rules that are "unequal"-that exclude defendants'
evidence but allow prosecutors' evidence-are unconstitutional. See generally Richard A.
Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1999).
126 Clark, 548 U.S. at 775.
12 7 Diminished capacity evidence is evidence that a defendant was incapable of acting with
a particular mens rea. See supra note 31 (discussing diminished capacity evidence).
12 8 See Morse, supra note 31, at 44 ("Except in utterly rare cases . . . mental health
professionals cannot determine if a person lacks the ability to form a mens rea, especially if the
determination involves a judgment about the person's past capacities. There is simply no way to
know this, no scientific test or technique that can provide the answer.").
12 9 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the classification system that the
Supreme Court imposed on mental disorder evidence in Clark).
o
30 See supra note 33 (discussing Arizona's Mott rule, which Arizona courts have
interpreted as imposing an absolute prohibition on non-insanity mental disorder evidence).
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trustworthy. This Article proposes that two types of evidence-
evidence that provides factual, background information about mental
disorder and evidence that describes a defendant's pre-offense history
of mental disorder-are both generally helpful and trustworthy,
and should not be excluded absent a particularized finding of
unhelpfulness or untrustworthiness.
B. Identifying Helpful and Trustworthy Mental Disorder Evidence
1. Facts About Mental Disorder
Clark's parents and friends testified Clark thought the people
in his town were aliens trying to kill him. These claims might
not be believable without a psychiatrist confirming the story
based on his experience with people who have exhibited
similar behaviors.131
Jurors are presumed to be capable of assessing most evidence
presented at a trial simply on the basis of their own experiences and
their commonsense understanding of the world.132 There are some
kinds of evidence, though, that jurors come to a trial unprepared to
assess, unless they happen to have had some very uncommon life
experiences. 133 Evidence of severe mental illness is one such kind of
131 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 783 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132 See Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 165, 166 (1989) ("Jurors are expected to make credibility decisions
based on their common sense, which is also termed intuition or experience." (footnote omitted));
Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE
L.J. 461, 464 n.10 (1996) [hereinafter Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics] ("Courts typically
assume that the life experiences of jurors allow them to make proper judgments about general
human reactions."); cf. Ronald J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Theory of the Right to Trial
by Jury, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 33, 37 (1988) ("[Jlurors' experiences and perspectives are crucial
variables in determining the effect of the words that a witness speaks at trial . . . .").
133 As one scholar who is otherwise rather critical of mental disorder evidence explains,
Both jurors and judges (indeed, all people) come to fact determination processes with
a set of life experiences that shape their evaluation of evidence. These experiences
are often simplified into convenient devices, sometimes called heuristics, that allow
humans to categorize observations quickly and thereby make decisions in a
complicated world. When these devices are inaccurate, expert testimony usefully
serves to correct them.
Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics, supra note 132, at 464 (footnotes omitted). This point has
been recognized by some courts in cases involving women who have remained in abusive
relationships. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass. 1999) ("The
jury, for example, may fault the victim for not leaving an abusive spouse, believing that they are
fully capable of putting themselves in the shoes of the defendant."); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (noting that for some jurors, "the fact that the battered wife stays on
unquestionably suggests that the 'beatings' could not have been too bad for if they had been, she
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evidence.134 In particular, jurors are likely to have misconceptions
about the plausibility of a mentally ill defendant's account of his
mental state.135 A defendant's description of his visions of the devil,
for example, or of his belief that the people he killed really are not
dead, might well sound to jurors as if the description were borrowed
from the latest made-for-television movie. Eric Clark claimed that
when he shot Officer Moritz, he believed the officer was an alien 36
a claim that is likely to be incredible to at least some jurors.13 7 To
someone who is unfamiliar with the symptoms of severe mental
illnesses, a defendant's account of such symptoms might well be
simply unbelievable. 38
certainly would have left").
14See United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We must be cautious
not to overstate the scope of the average juror's common understanding and knowledge. As the
Seventh Circuit has recognized, it is 'precisely because juries are unlikely to know that social
scientists and psychologists have identified [personality disorders] ... that the testimony would
have assisted the jury in making its decision."' (omission in original) (quoting United States v.
Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1996))). A similar point has been recognized regarding
jurors' need for factual background information in order to properly assess the evidence in some
sexual assault cases. See Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 273 (Del. 1987) ("[Wlhere a
complainant's behavior or testimony is, to the average layperson, superficially inconsistent with
the occurrence of a rape, and is otherwise inadequately explained, thus requiring an expert's
explanation of its emotional antecedents, expert testimony can assist a jury in this regard.");
State v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. 1988) ("[Aln expert opinion is useful for disabusing
the jury of common misconceptions about the behavior of sexual assault victims."). See also
generally Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 133 (1989) (evaluating juries' use of social
framework evidence).
35 See Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427,
485 (1980) ("Because laymen do not deal with abnormal behavior on a day-to-day basis, their
intuitions are skewed in the direction of normal behavior, and they favor commonsense
explanations for departures from the norm."); Don J. DeBenedictis, Criminal Minds: PET Scans
Used to Prove Accused Killers' Brain Abnormalities, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 30, 30 ("Most
juries feel that most mental patients are really faking." (quoting Dr. Bernard Diamond, Professor
Emeritus of Law and Medicine, University of California at Berkeley)).
136 Clark, 548 U.S. at 745.
'
37 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Additionally, jurors may be skeptical not
only about a particular defendant's impaired mental state but about whether any defendant's
impaired mental state ought to be at all exculpatory. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of
Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 675 (2007) (observing that mens rea "seems to
be one of a handful of legal precepts that simply does not resonate with the general public").
138 Consider, for example, the reaction of Harvard Professor George Mackey upon learning
of the delusional beliefs of his friend John Nash, a brilliant mathematician who was diagnosed
with schizophrenia:
"How could you," began Mackey, "how could you, a mathematician, a man devoted
to reason and logical proof . . . how could you believe that extraterrestrials are
sending you messages? How could you believe that you are being recruited by aliens
from outer space to save the world? How could you ... ?"
SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND 11 (1998), quoted in Joanmarie laria Davoli, Psychiatric
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In these cases, jurors need evidence that educates them that such
symptoms are not necessarily fabrications-that people with no
motive to lie also report experiencing the same kinds of symptoms.1
A witness providing such evidence should not be permitted to testify
that the defendant is necessarily telling the truth, but the witness
should be permitted to present evidence that will enable a jury to
conclude that the defendant is not necessarily not telling the truth. 4
Informing the jury that some people really do see things that do
not exist, or do hold beliefs that have no basis in reality, is perhaps
the most important objective that mental disorder evidence can
accomplish in cases like Clark-cases in which the defendant claims
Evidence on Trial, 56 SMU L. REV. 2191, 2214 (2003).
39 Many examples of such people can be found in civil commitment cases (which are
useful because a person facing civil commitment usually has no incentive to fabricate the
experience of psychotic symptoms; in fact, such a person usually has the opposite incentive-to
deny the experience of symptoms that they really are experiencing). See, e.g., Purdy v. United
States, No. 04-3529-CV-S-DW, 2006 WL 2990501, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2006) (noting that
plaintiff, who was then subject to civil commitment and not facing any present criminal charges,
"suffered from delusional beliefs that his wife and other family members had been replaced by
imposters" and "believed that the FBI replaced his wife in an attempt to spy on him and gather
information about his past criminal activity"); State v. Sea, 904 P.2d 182, 184 (Or. Ct. App.
1995) (noting that appellant, who was challenging a civil commitment order, "believe[d] that
objects in her home ha[d] been removed or rearranged by unidentifiable people or forces" and
"hear[d] loud sounds emanating from shelves of merchandise at grocery stores and believe[d]
that unseen forces [were] communicating with her through the labels of packaged goods"). The
DSM provides additional examples:
Persecutory delusions are most common; the person believes he or she is being
tormented, followed, tricked, spied on, or ridiculed. Referential delusions are also
common; the person believes that certain gestures, comments, passages from books,
newspapers, song lyrics, or other environmental cues are specifically directed at him
or her....
... An example of a bizarre delusion is a person's belief that a stranger has
removed his or her internal organs and has replaced them with someone else's organs
without leaving any wounds or scars. An example of a nonbizarre delusion is a
person's false belief that he or she is under surveillance by the police. Delusions that
express a loss of control over mind or body are generally considered to be bizarre;
these include a person's belief that his or her thoughts have been taken away by
some outside forces ("thought withdrawal"), that alien thoughts have been put into
his or her mind ("thought insertion"), or that his or her body or actions are being
acted on or manipulated by some outside force ("delusions of control").
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS:
DSM-IV-TR 299 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
'Some courts have adopted a similar approach in dealing with other types of syndrome
evidence. For example, expert testimony that provides factual background information about
child abuse can enable jurors to not automatically discount the credibility of a child who reports
abuse but who does not act in ways that jurors would expect. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Deloney, 794 N.E.2d 613, 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (endorsing admission of expert testimony
"to educate the jury to understand that child abuse victims may act in counter-intuitive ways,
and that excessive weight should not be given to factors such as failure to disclose when the
child victim's credibility is weighed").
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to have had mental experiences that are so different from the average
person's mental experiences that jurors are apt to incorrectly conclude
that the defendant's report of such experiences cannot possibly be
true.14 1 Such evidence will be most helpful and least untrustworthy
when it focuses on particularized symptoms rather than more abstract
diagnostic categories. For defendants like Clark, what is likely to
matter most is not evidence of a diagnostic label but rather evidence
of the symptoms that a diagnosis encompasses.14 2 So regardless of
what the scientific community might think about the acceptability of
the diagnostic category of schizophrenia,14 3 for example, scientists do
not dispute that the symptoms underlying such a diagnosis-in
particular, delusions and hallucinations-really do exist.'" The
defendant's primary concern is not whether the jury believes that a
particular diagnostic label is the proper one for his symptoms; what is
most important to the defendant is that the jury understands his
141 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
142 Psychiatric diagnoses are attempts to impose a taxonomic system upon the world of
experienced symptoms. These diagnoses are intended primarily to further research:
Medicine, like science as a whole, began with a descriptive phase, in which
phenomena of interest were categorized and classified on the basis of common
observed elements. Without this taxonomic data base, further research would have
been impossible because such research requires comparable populations of subjects
so that findings can be reproduced by different investigators.
Robert D. Miller, History of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Guidebook for Nonclinicians, COLO.
LAW., Jan. 1994, at 39, 39.
14 3 The acceptability of a psychiatric diagnosis is a function of two things: validity and
reliability. The validity of a psychiatric diagnosis depends upon how well the diagnostic criteria
map onto a real phenomenon in the world. Validity is exceptionally hard to assess.
"[D]emonstrating how the validity of the diagnosis has improved would be difficult. In fact,
such a demonstration would necessitate a preconceived notion (or theory) of schizophrenia."
Conklin & Iacono, supra note 121, at 407. The reliability of a psychiatric diagnosis depends
upon how often different clinicians assign the same diagnostic label to the same set of
symptoms. Commentators disagree about the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses. Compare
Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials:
From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 100, 105-06 (1999)
(claiming that "error rates" are "well above 50% for diagnoses such as antisocial personality and
schizoid personality, and not much better for schizophrenia and organic disorder"), with The
Supreme Court, 2005 Term: Leading Cases, 120 HARv. L. REv. 125, 232 (2006) ("Although
psychiatry may have begun on more questionable scientific footing than some other disciplines,
recent advances in psychiatric research have brought many common psychiatric diagnoses to a
level of reliability on par with that of 'radiologists' interpretations of mammograms[J and the
assessment of spasticity in patients with spinal cord injury."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Davoli, supra note 138, at 2219)).
144 Not even the most extreme skeptics of psychiatry and its diagnostic enterprise doubt
that the symptoms that underlie psychiatric diagnoses are real. Thomas Szasz, for example,
argues stridently that "mental illness is a myth," but his objection is to the labeling of certain
mental experiences as signs of an illness; he does not suggest that those mental experiences
themselves are myths. See generally THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS:
FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961).
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symptoms.145 For Clark, it was the delusional belief that Officer
Moritz was an alien, not the diagnostic label of schizophrenia, that
had the potential to raise reasonable doubt about mens rea.
Allowing defendants to present evidence for the purpose of
correcting jurors' misconceptions about the symptoms of mental
illnesses mostly avoids the issues that led the Supreme Court to
conclude that Arizona had "good enough" reasons for prohibiting
defendants from presenting such evidence. 147 This evidence is
not about diminished capacity, experts are unlikely to disagree,
and it does not depend upon potentially speculative diagnostic
categorizations. And it is likely to be helpful as well as trustworthy.
a. Helpfulness
If jurors already know that some people really do hold delusional
beliefs about aliens taking over the bodies of human beings, then
expert testimony about such beliefs is not helpful because it tells the
jurors something that they already know. 14 8 Some critics of syndrome
evidence have suggested that proponents of such evidence
overestimate jurors' misconceptions. 14 9 But while it might be true that
some symptoms that defendants might seek to offer evidence about
are already generally known to jurors, it is hard to believe that
this is true of the symptoms of serious mental illnesses such
as schizophrenia. Misconceptions about the insanity defense in
s
45 See Morse, supra note 31, at 53 ("Judges and juries need behavioral facts about the
defendant's functioning, not labels that have been developed for nonlegal purposes.").
146 This is not to say that testimony about schizophrenia would not be additionally helpful;
the point is only that disagreement about diagnostic labels should not be any reason to prohibit
defendants from presenting evidence about the symptoms that define a psychiatric diagnosis.
14 7 Cf Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics, supra note 132, at 464 (noting that when
admitted for the "limited purpose of supporting the credibility of a witness after that credibility
has been attacked, the evidence is far more likely to be scientifically valid and sufficiently
valuable to justify admission").
148 At least one state has adopted a rule that makes helpfulness in correcting jurors' false
beliefs a requirement for admitting expert testimony. Under the Ohio Rules of Evidence, one
requirement for the admission of expert testimony is that "[tihe witness' testimony either relates
to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
misconception common among lay persons." OHIO R. EvID. 702(A).
149 See, e.g., David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 82 (1997) ("Clourts do little more than cite the recurring
fear that juries hold [certain] 'common myths' about battered women."); Robert P. Mosteller,
Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social
Framework Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 85, 125 ("It is hardly
obvious that jurors would have great difficulty understanding why, for example, a child would
retract a valid allegation of sexual abuse in the face of the prospect that 'daddy' would
otherwise be jailed.").
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particular are legion.150 And attitudes toward defendants who raise
any claim of mental illness at all are intensely skeptical.15
That mental illnesses are diagnosed on the basis of clinical
judgment, and not on the basis of such objective measures as a blood
test or brain scan, is likely to blame for some of the skepticism.15 2 But
while mental illnesses are easier to fake than are at least some
physical illnesses, they are not nearly as easy to fake as most people
believe.153 It is of course possible that a defendant might be faking the
15oSee NAT'L COMM'N ON THE INSANITY DEF., MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 14 (1983) (noting that "mentally ill people
in our society are shrouded in myth, preventing us as a society from seeing this vulnerable
segment of society objectively, equitably, and with sensitivity"); Eric Silver et al.,
Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 63,
68 (1994) ("[T]he public overestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are released upon
acquittal and underestimates the extent to which they are hospitalized as well as the length of
confinement of insanity acquittees who are sent to mental hospitals.").
151 See Fradella, supra note 114, at 12-13 (observing "much public concern about
defendants who fake their mental illnesses in order to escape a conviction and who simply hire
clinicians to engage in an expert battle with the prosecution at trial"); Mello, supra note 3, at
470 ("Juries are notoriously skeptical of mental illness defenses, even in cases where the illness
is clear.").
152 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 44 (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mental
health/chapter2/sec2.html#diagnosis ("The diagnosis of mental disorders is often believed to be
more difficult than diagnosis of somatic, or general medical, disorders, since there is no
definitive lesion, laboratory test, or abnormality in brain tissue that can identify the illness.");
Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 10 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 185, 201 (2001) ("No mental illness, other than some organic mental disorders,
can be diagnosed as reliably as cancer or bacterial infections. There is no blood test for mental
disorders.").
153 See Fradella, supra note 114, at 13 ("In practice, modem diagnostic instruments and
procedures allow clinicians to distinguish correctly those who are truly mentally ill and those
who are faking between 92% and 95% of the time."); Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Case
Against Abandoning the Search for Substantive Accuracy, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1031,
1033-42 (2008) (discussing numerous methods for identifying malingerers); Susan F.
Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The Constitutional Dilemma of Mental
Abnormality and Intoxication Defenses, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 221, 239 (1984) ("One must first
ask how easy it is to feign the type of mental abnormality and intoxication that will preclude the
existence of a subjectively defined mental state. It seems unlikely that a great number of
defendants would be able to fake such conditions convincingly."); cf. Jamie Fellner, A
Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 391, 398
n.32 (2006) ("Concern about malingering, prisoners faking mental illness or symptoms for
different purposes, is pervasive among prison officials, even though serious mental illness is in
fact difficult to fake.").
The reason that psychosis is not easy to fake is that genuine psychotic symptoms do
conform to certain patterns, which are unlikely to be known by most people who might wish to
fake such symptoms. For example, "[t]he pattern of memory impairment in genuine cases of
schizophrenia is similar to that seen in organic brain conditions, particularly traumatic brain
injury, and thus feigned memory impairment in cases of malingered psychosis can be readily
distinguished." L. Paul Chesterman et al., Malingered Psychosis, 19 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY
& PSYCHOL. 275, 289 (2008). Additionally, "feigned hallucinations tend to be visual, [and]
feigned delusions lack the logical inconsistencies of true delusions." Id. at 277-78.
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symptoms of a mental illness, 154 but jurors seem likely to vastly
overestimate this possibility.
In some sense, jurors cannot be faulted too much for their
skepticism regarding criminal defendants' claims of psychotic
symptoms. Many psychotic symptoms do have a ring of
unbelievability-hearing voices, receiving special communications,
thinking that someone who was a human being yesterday is an alien
today.' Some jurors will in their everyday lives have encountered
someone who really does hear or see things that do not exist, or who
really does believe things that cannot possibly be true. For most
jurors, though, evidence that people who are not criminal defendants
do experience these kinds of psychotic symptoms is likely to be
helpful-that is, such evidence is likely to inform the jurors of
something they do not already know.156
b. Trustworthiness
Not only is factual, background evidence about mental disorder
likely to be helpful, it is also likely to be trustworthy.157 It simply
cannot be disputed that some people experience psychotic symptoms,
such as the delusional belief that aliens have taken over the bodies of
human beings. 158 It is possible to imagine that jurors might be misled
'"It is also possible that a defendant (or any other witness) might be lying about any
number of other things, such as whether he was in another state at the time a crime was
committed or whether the police coerced his confession. This possibility does not mean, of
course, that witnesses are prohibited from presenting evidence for the purpose of proving that
they were out of the state or that they were coerced into confessing.
55 See supra note 139 (presenting examples of delusional beliefs).
156Even with expert testimony confirming the possibility that the defendant is not
fabricating his account, jurors are likely to remain skeptical:
In sum, experts' explanations of human behavior that run contrary to notions of free
will are hard to sell to the jury. Jurors drew heavily upon their own experiences and
outlooks on personal responsibility and concluded that most experts were looking at
the world through the perspective of a textbook rather than that of real life. Not
unexpectedly, this skepticism about clinical testimony had the greatest impact on the
defense experts, because they were the ones generally espousing theories in conflict
with the jurors' notions of human behavior and responsibility.
Sundby, The Jury as Critic, supra note 101, at 1139 (footnote omitted).
'"See Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics, supra note 132, at 468 ("[W]hen the group
character evidence is being used for credibility purposes-to correct human misunderstandings
of the apparently unusual and therefore suspicious reactions of a trial participant-the
requirements of validity are much less exacting from a scientific perspective, and the dangers of
jury misuse of the evidence, while real, are typically less grave.").
158 For example, Capgras syndrome, characterized by delusions of substitution, is not
uncommon among people diagnosed with schizophrenia. See United States v. Rix, 574 F. Supp.
2d 726, 732 (S.D. Tex. 2008) ("There are various types of bizarre delusions, such as 'Capgras
Syndrome,' which is the belief that a close relative or friend has been replaced by an impostor
who is an exact double (or doppelganger).").
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or confused about such evidence, but if we allow juries to render
verdicts in cases like Clark, in which the defendant's account of his
mental state at the time of the offense is that he believed the police
officer that he shot was an alien,159 we must believe that jurors are
capable of thinking properly about evidence of the facts of mental
disorder.160 A criminal defendant has a right to be tried by a jury
composed of people who are capable of understanding the issues that
matter to the decisions the jury must make.161 One of the purposes
served by the Sixth Amendment's mandate that a defendant be tried
by a jury "of the State and district where in the crime shall have been
committed"l 62 is that members of that jury will be the defendant's
peers-people who come from similar circumstances as the defendant
and can envision themselves in the defendant's place.16 3 Jurors who
do not understand a defendant's mental illness cannot fulfill this
purpose.
2. Facts About Defendants
A harder question is whether a defendant should be allowed to
present evidence for the purpose of proving that he has a history of a
certain mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, or of a certain
' Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 (2006).
16oAs the Supreme Court explained in Barefoot v. Estelle,
All of these professional doubts about the usefulness of psychiatric predictions can
be called to the attention of the jury. Petitioner's entire argument ... is founded on
the premise that a jury will not be able to separate the wheat from the chaff. We do
not share in this low evaluation of the adversary process.
463 U.S. 880, 901 n.7 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
(2006), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). Since Clark, at least one
court has similarly concluded that jurors are capable of properly considering mental disorder
evidence: "We, like the dissenting justices in Clark, have confidence that our Texas judges and
juries are sufficiently sophisticated to evaluate expert mental-disease testimony in the context of
rebutting mens rea just as they are in evaluating an insanity or mental-retardation claim." Ruffin
v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
161 Cf Christopher Slobogin, Experts, Mental States, and Acts, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.
1009, 1017 (2008) ("Depriving a defendant of a qualified expert on past mental state issues
trenches on the right to . . . have one's charges considered by a (fully informed) jury.");
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999) (referring to the defendant's
"right of having a fully informed jury determine his sentence").16 2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'
63 See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine,
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REv. 501, 518 (1986) ("The jury represents the defendant's
hope of a hearing by others of common experience."); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 536 n. 19 (1975) ("The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals
of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors,
fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status as that which he holds . . . ." (quoting
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879))); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968) ("If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored
but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.").
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symptom, such as delusions. On one hand, such evidence presents a
greater risk of misuse than does evidence that is not about the
defendant in particular.'6" So long as a witness does not say anything
about the defendant in particular, the jury cannot simply adopt the
witness's assessment of the defendant.
On the other hand, the risk that evidence of a defendant's history
of mental disorder will be misused can be minimized by limiting
it to evidence about the defendant's history before the offense.
This limitation is consistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules
of Evidence's exception to the hearsay rule allowing an
out-of-coiart statement to be admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted if the statement is "offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive."165 While evidence of a defendant's mental
disorder history would not be hearsay, and thus not governed directly
by Rule 801, this exception suggests that evidence that is otherwise at
least somewhat untrustworthy-whether hearsay statements or
evidence about mental disorder history-ought to be admissible for
the purpose of correcting jurors' misconceptions-whether those
misconceptions relate to experiences that are significantly outside the
realm of the average juror's experiences (and thus likely to be viewed
as fabrications) or to a more direct charge of fabrication. In Tome v.
United States,166 the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 801 to require
that the out of court statement have been made before the motive to
lie arose. 167 For defendants such as Clark, the motive to lie would
have arisen at the time of the offense.168 Thus, allowing evidence
about a defendant's pre-offense history of mental disorder can be
appropriate as a means to counter jurors' tendencies to believe-or
in some cases, as a means to counter the prosecutor's explicit
164 Cf. State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989) (holding that "in future cases
expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome will be limited to a description of the
general syndrome and the characteristics which are present in an individual suffering from the
syndrome. The expert should not be allowed to testify as to the ultimate fact that the particular
defendant actually suffers from battered woman syndrome.").
65 FED. R. EVID 801(d)(1)(B) (providing for the admission of a statement that is otherwise
excluded as hearsay if "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive").
'513 U.S. 150 (1995).
I
67 See id. at 167 ("The Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent
out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive.").
168 Cf. People v. Singer, 89 N.E2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949) ("'Recently fabricated' means the
same thing as fabricated to meet the exigencies of the case.").
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argumentl 69 -that the defendant's account of his mental state at the
time of the offense sounds too convenient to possibly be true. Not
allowing a criminal defendant to present trustworthy evidence that
would equip jurors to assess this possibility according to its merits,
rather than according to their misconceptions about mental disorder,
lessens the prosecutor's burden of proof and denies the defendant the
right to be convicted of a criminal offense only upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
IV. THE RIGHT TO RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT MEETS STATES'
AUTHORITY OVER CRIMINAL LAW
The authority to define and enforce criminal laws rests, of
course, primarily with the states.170 Just as certainly, however, the
Constitution imposes some limits on the states' authority in this
area. For example, every legislature has adopted a presumption of
sanity, so that prosecutors need not in every case present evidence
that the defendant was sane at the time he committed an offense.17 2
But this presumption ought not to be enforced by prohibiting criminal
defendants from presenting evidence for the purpose of raising
reasonable doubt about the mens rea element of a charged offense.
Moreover, while legislatures might have the authority to define
mental states as either elements of an offense or elements of an
affirmative defense,173 absent clear legislative action courts should not
'
69 See Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History
Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
963, 979 (2008) ("A common tactic of the state is to attack defense mental health issues as
fabricated excuses for the client's criminal behavior. Therefore, mental health conditions that
pre-existed his crime are more credible than newly diagnosed conditions."). Even when the
prosecutor does not directly assert that a defendant is fabricating a claim of mental disorder, the
prosecution's theory of the case often is that the defendant is fabricating the effect of mental
disorder on his thought process at the time of the offense. The state's expert witness in Clark,
for example, did not challenge Clark's claim of mental disorder but instead argued that even
though Clark experienced symptoms of schizophrenia, he nevertheless knew what he was doing
when he shot a police officer. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745 (2006) (reporting that
"[iln rebuttal, a psychiatrist for the State gave his opinion that Clark's paranoid schizophrenia
did not keep him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct").
17 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) ("The States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law.").
171 See supra notes 69-91 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limits on
excluding defense evidence).
172 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 766-67 ("'The presumption of sanity is ... universal in some
variety or other, being (at least) a presumption that a defendant has the capacity to form the
mens rea necessary for a verdict of guilt and the consequent criminal responsibility. This
presumption dispenses with a requirement on the government's part to include as an element of
every criminal charge an allegation that the defendant had such a capacity." (citations omitted)).
173 See discussion infra note 193.
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presume that mental states, which have long been elements of
offenses, have suddenly become elements of affirmative defenses.
A. A Presumption of Sanity
The Supreme Court in Clark acknowledged that Arizona's
rule that prohibited Clark from presenting mental disorder evidence
for the purpose of raising reasonable doubt about the mens rea
element of first-degree murder potentially violated Clark's due
process rights.174 Arizona's rule did not actually violate due process,
the Court determined, because Arizona had "good enough" reasons
for excluding Clark's evidence.175 But while Arizona might have
good enough reasons for excluding some mental disorder evidence,
Arizona does not have good enough reasons for excluding all such
evidence.17 6 In particular, the trial court should not have excluded
evidence explaining that some people do experience the types of
bizarre delusionsl7 7 that Clark claimed to experience, or evidence of
Clark's pre-offense history of symptoms of schizophrenia, without a
determination that in this particular case the evidence would have
been unhelpful or untrustworthy.
The exclusion of all mental disorder evidence in Clark effectively
lessened the prosecution's burden of proof regarding mens rea. Under
Winship, the prosecution is required to prove mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt,17 8 but under Clark, this burden is lessened because
the defendant is prohibited from presenting helpful, trustworthy
evidence that might raise reasonable doubt.179 One of the most
frustrating aspects of the Supreme Court's opinion in Clark is that the
Court recognized the connection between rules regarding mental
disorder evidence and burdens of proof. 80 The Court seems to have
174 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
176See supra Part U.B (discussing categories of mental disorder evidence that are
generally helpful and trustworthy).
7 "Bizarre delusion" is a psychiatric term of art, referring to a delusion that cannot
possibly be true, such as a person's belief that she is being sent special messages through the
headlines of the newspaper. A "nonbizarre delusion" is a delusion that might possibly be true,
such as a person's belief that he is being followed by the CIA. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 139,
at 299 ("Delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable
and do not derive from ordinary life experiences.").
178 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
'
79 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
1so The Court explained:
In jurisdictions that allow mental-disease and capacity evidence to be considered on
par with any other relevant evidence when deciding whether the prosecution has
proven mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence of mental disease or
incapacity need only support what the factfinder regards as a reasonable doubt about
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concluded, though, that Arizona's rule excluding mental disorder
evidence was justified by Arizona's desire to enforce a presumption
of sanity, a presumption that would be threatened if defendants could
present mental disorder evidence to disprove mens rea.
A presumption of sanity is unproblematic, as a general matter.
But prohibiting criminal defendants from presenting helpful,
trustworthy evidence that might raise a reasonable doubt about an
element of a charged offense is not just recognizing a presumption of
sanity-it is enforcing a presumption of sanity at the expense of the
defendant's right not to be found guilty absent proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 83
States might, as the Clark Court recognized, have an additional
reason for wanting to prohibit criminal defendants from offering
mental disorder evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea. This
evidence not only threatens a state's desire to enforce a presumption
of sanity but also threatens a state's preference for mentally ill
criminal defendants to be found "not guilty by reason of insanity"
rather than to be found simply "not guilty" based on reasonable doubt
about mens rea. States might prefer "not guilty by reason of insanity"
verdicts because a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of
insanity is usually thereby subject to more or less automatic civil
commitment. 184 Such a preference ought to be accorded little if any
the capacity to form (or the actual formation of) the mens rea, in order to require
acquittal of the charge.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 768.
181 The Court explained:
The presumption of sanity would then be only as strong as the evidence a factfinder
would accept as enough to raise a reasonable doubt about mens rea for the crime
charged; once reasonable doubt was found, acquittal would be required, and the
standards established for the defense of insanity would go by the boards.
Id. at 771-72.
182 See Ronald J. Allen, Clark v. Arizona: Much (Confused) Ado About Nothing, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 135, 137 (2006) ("Since sanity is not a constitutionally necessary component of a
state's case, a state can allocate the burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion more or less
how it likes.").
'
83 See Westen, supra note 36, at 159 ("[I]n order to effectuate its legislative decision to
place the burden of persuasion on defendants with respect to the mens rea consequences of
insanity, Arizona implicitly abolished any requirement that the prosecution bear the burden of
proving 'knowledge' beyond a reasonable doubt in cases in which defendants allege that they
lacked such knowledge because of mental illness.").
8 The Court explained:
If an acquitted defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect that makes him
dangerous, he will neither be confined nor treated psychiatrically unless a judge so
orders after some independent commitment proceeding. But if a defendant succeeds
in showing himself insane, Arizona law (and presumably that of every other State
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consideration, however, because a defendant who is found not guilty
after raising reasonable doubt about mens rea is also subject to civil
commitment. 185 In every state, someone who is an imminent danger to
himself or others because of a mental disorder is subject to civil
commitment. 18 6 If a state's civil commitment rules are too narrow to
allow for the involuntary treatment of a mentally ill criminal
defendant who has been found not guilty of criminal charges on the
basis of reasonable doubt about mens rea, the solution should be to
revise those rules, not to prohibit criminal defendants from presenting
evidence for the purpose of raising reasonable doubt about an element
of a charged offense. 18 7 A criminal conviction should not be regarded
as a proper substitute for appropriate civil commitment rules.
Moreover, and despite fears to the contrary,188 rarely will mental
disorder evidence negate mens rea for every criminal offense with
with an insanity rule) will require commitment and treatment as a consequence of
that finding without more. It makes sense, then, to channel capacity evidence to the
issue structured to deal with mental incapacity when such a claim is raised
successfully.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 778 n.45.
'
85 Samuel Jan Brakel, After the Verdict: Dispositional Decisions Regarding Criminal
Defendants Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 181, 187 (1988)
("[C]ommitting insanity acquittees in a civil commitment proceeding is ... always available.
The law does not say that insanity acquitees or any other group of persons shall not be civilly
committed.").
'""Every state allows involuntary hospitalization when someone, because of a mental
illness, is dangerous to himself or to other people." Dora W. Klein, Autonomy and Acute
Psychosis: When Choices Collide, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 355, 375 (2008) (citing Alexander
Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29 (2003) ("Every state has enacted a form of civil commitment law."));
Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal
Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199, 1246 n.172 (2000) (noting that "[e]very state allows commitment
of those who are mentally ill and dangerous")).
8 As the Supreme Court of California explained:
The solution to this problem [of the mentally ill criminal defendant who might be
released from confinement if found not guilty] thus does not lie in barring the
defense of diminished capacity when the charged crime lacks a lesser included
offense, but in providing for the confinement and treatment of defendants with
diminished capacity arising from mental disease or defect.
People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308, 1315 (1978), superseded by statute, 1981 Cal. Stat. 1592
(codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West 2008)).
'
8 See Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The State ... fear[s]
that admitting psychiatric testimony to disprove specific intent may cause judges and juries to
find legally sane defendants not guilty and, consequently, 'guilty' persons will be absolved of
criminal responsibility for mental abnormalities not amounting to insanity." (footnote omitted));
State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1055 ("[I]f we adopted the defendant's position and allowed
expert testimony such as this to negate specific intent, the result would be, as we said in
Schantz, to compel juries to 'release[] upon society many dangerous criminals who obviously
should be placed under confinement."' (second alteration in original)); see also Morse, supra
note 31, at 13 (discussing the fear that "[i]f defendants are permitted to defeat the prosecution's
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which a defendant might be charged. As a general matter, mental
disorder usually does not negate mens rea.18 9 But even in those
exceptional cases in which mental disorder does impair mens rea
regarding a specific element of an offense-such as the element of
intentionally or knowingly killing a police officer-mental disorder
almost never negates mens rea altogether.1 90 In Clark, for example, if
mental disorder evidence had raised reasonable doubt about whether
Clark intentionally or knowingly killed a police officer, Clark likely
would still have been guilty of either second-degree murder or
manslaughter. 91 Thus, states need not prohibit defendants from
presenting evidence of mental disorder out of a fear that if such
evidence raises reasonable doubt about a particular mens rea,
mentally ill defendants will be released from all state supervision.
B. The Definition of Offense Elements and Affirmative Defenses
It is possible to view the problems that rules like Arizona's create
as harmless, because the state's legislature could redefine murder as
a strict liability offense and make the absence of mens rea an
affirmative defense,19 2 in which case the legislature could then place
the burden of proving the absence of mens rea, by whatever standard
it wanted, on the defendant. 19 3 Arizona itself made this argument
case using evidence of mental abnormality, dangerous offenders will be freed").
'89 Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two
Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 827, 834 (1977) ("[M]ost mentally
abnormal offenders are fully capable of thinking about their criminal act . . .and then
performing it in accordance with their preconceived plan.").
190 Morse, supra note 31, at 17 ("Even the craziest defendants ... are unlikely to produce
credible evidence that they lacked any mens rea.").
'9' See Christopher Slobogin, The Supreme Court's Recent Mental Health Cases, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 2007, at 8, 13 ("[I]t is hard to see why states should be able to keep from the jury
psychiatric testimony on mens rea that, in those rare situations where it is persuasive, will
usually at most result in reduction of the charge (in Clark's case, probably to second degree
murder).").
192 Peter Westen has suggested that Arizona's law can be characterized as defining murder
as including "a mens rea requirement of 'intent' or 'knowledge,' but only in those who are
sane" and including "no mens rea requirements at all for persons who are insane," yet providing
that "[ilt is nonetheless a defense to murder to show by clear and convincing evidence that,
because of mental illness, a person did not 'know' that he was in fact killing a human being."
Westen, supra note 36, at 160-61 (emphasis omitted).
193 At least it might be possible that the state could make murder a strict liability offense
(that is, one not requiring any mens rea) and then establish lack of mens rea as an affirmative
defense. The Supreme Court has provided inconsistent signals about the extent to which states
may redefine elements as affirmative defenses. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975) (suggesting that there are limits to states' ability to redefine elements as defenses), and
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (same), and Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957) (same), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (suggesting that states are free
to redefine elements as defenses), and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion)
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before the Supreme Court in Clark.19 4 But unless and until the
Arizona legislature clearly redefines murder in this way, prohibiting
defendants from presenting helpful, trustworthy mental disorder
evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea violates due
process. 195 Courts should insist that the prosecution prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every element of an offense as a legislature has
(same).
Morissette v. United States is an interesting and inconclusive precedent. 342 U.S. 246
(1952). On one hand, Morissette stresses the fundamental nature of mens rea. Id. at 250 ("The
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial
or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil."). On the other hand, in Morissette the Court was interpreting a statute that was
silent on the issue of men rea, not one that had clearly intended to omit the mens rea element
from a serious offense. Id. at 263 ("The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal
judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of
enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components
contemplated by the words used in the statute." (footnote omitted)).
Not surprisingly, commentators disagree whether the state could redefine murder as a
strict liability offense. Compare Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 797-98 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Under the State's logic, a person would be guilty of first-degree murder if he
knowingly or intentionally killed a police officer or committed the killing under circumstances
that would show knowledge or intent but for the defendant's mental illness. To begin with,
Arizona law does not say this. And if it did, it would be impermissible."), with Westen, supra
note 36, at 161 ("Contrary to the dissent, Arizona clearly has authority to characterize its law in
this way (the characterization being consistent with the law's substance)." (footnote omitted)).
For further discussion, see generally Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1467 (2001), and Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule, supra note 48.
'See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 36, Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (No. 05-5966), 2006
WL 565617 ("The Arizona Legislature's rejection of the Model Penal Code provision means
that the mens rea elements of criminal offenses are defined without regard to mental disease or
defect. Thus, when determining whether a defendant has intentionally or knowingly committed
a criminal act, any mental disease or defect is statutorily irrelevant to the factual question."); see
also Westen, supra note 36, at 160 (noting that "Arizona, in its brief, endeavored . . . to
recharacterize what constitutes the 'elements' of and 'defenses' to murder under its law"). An
amicus brief submitted by the United States similarly argued that a state may either "effectively
redefine the elements of its offenses by declaring mental illness evidence irrelevant to the mens
rea determination, or it can establish an evidentiary rule treating that evidence as inadmissible,"
and suggested that "Arizona appears to have chosen the redefinition approach." Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16-17, Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (No.
05-5966), 2006 WL 542415.
195 Addressing a somewhat different question-whether the state could, without violating
due process, altogether abolish the insanity defense-the Supreme Court of Nevada argued:
Historically, the mens rea of most crimes, particularly specific intent crimes,
incorporates some element of wrongfulness as that term is used in Lewis and
M'Naghten. The Legislature can only eliminate this concept of wrongfulness if it
redefines the crime itself, in other words, if it chooses to make the act, regardless of
the mental state, the crime. Thus murder could simply be defined as the killing of a
human being. But so long as a crime requires some additional mental intent, then
legal insanity must be a complete defense to that crime.
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84 (Nev. 2001).
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actually defined it-not as a legislature might have defined it.196
Moreover, redefining the elements of criminal offenses to overcome
constitutional principles is easy to imagine but not especially
common. 197 For example, after the Supreme Court in Patterson v.
New Yorkl 98 upheld a state statute that required the defendant to prove
"extreme emotional distress" as a partial affirmative defense to
murder,199 states did not en masse revise their criminal codes to
redefine mens rea elements as affirmative defenses. 200 Similarly, after
the Supreme Court ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey that facts other
than a prior conviction that increase a sentence above a statutory
maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,201 there was
concern that legislatures would respond by raising maximum
sentences and redefining elements of offenses as sentencing factors or
affirmative defenses so that judges could continue to impose
sentences based on facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.202
These fears, however, have largely not been realized.2 03
196 Ronald J. Allen, Foreward: Montana v. Egelhoff-Reflections on the Limits of
Legislative Imagination and Judicial Authority, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 660 (1997)
("Evidence rules should be rational. The process of proof should have integrity, regardless of
what is being proved. Substantive changes in the elements of crimes should be made by changes
in the substantive law, not by manipulating the rules of proof in ways that undercut their
rationality." (quoting Charles Nesson's response to the article)).
197See, e.g., Morse & Hoffman, supra note 35, at 1111 ("[N]o legislature, to our
knowledge, has ever been so bold as to purport to convert a serious common law crime into a
strict liability crime."). For discussion, see generally Allen, supra note 196; Ronald J. Allen,
The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B.
Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J.
1325 (1979); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the
Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995).
198 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
9 Id. at 209-ll.
200See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 255, 272 (2001) (noting that after Patterson, "many feared the worst-that legislatures
would seize the opportunity to shift many factors from the category of 'elements of the crime' to
the category of 'affirmative defenses,' thus shifting the burden of proof and tipping the scales of
justice against defendants. But the worst never actually occurred." (footnote omitted)); Stith,
supra note 8, at 267 ("[T]here was little change in the statutory structure of 'elements' and
'defenses' in response to Patterson."); id. at 267 n.243 ("[A] total of nine states amended their
homicide statutes as allowed by Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 (1977)" (citing King &
Klein, supra note 193, app. A at 1546 (2001))).
201 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2 02 See generally Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387 (2002)
(discussing constitutional limits on definitions of offense elements, affirmative defenses, and
sentencing factors); King & Klein, supra note 193, at 1488-96 (discussing the "opportunities for
legislators to respond to Apprendi by modifying their criminal codes").
203 See, e.g., Stith, supra note 8, at 267 ("[A]s it happens, there is no evidence that state
legislatures or Congress responded to Apprendi by restructuring statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
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It is also possible to argue that the Supreme Court's decision
in Montana v. Egelhoff204 is inconsistent with a defendant's
constitutional right to present mental disorder evidence for the
purpose of raising reasonable doubt about the mens rea element of a
charged offense. In Egelhoff, the Court ruled that Montana did not
violate due process by prohibiting defendants from presenting
evidence of voluntary intoxication for the purpose of disproving the
mens rea of any criminal offense.205 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court considered whether "a defendant's right to have a jury consider
evidence of his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he
possesses the requisite mental state is a 'fundamental principle of
justice."' 206 Because the common law historically did not recognize
voluntary intoxication as a valid defense to a criminal charge,207 the
Court found that the right to present evidence of voluntary
intoxication was not "fundamental."208
Additionally, in considering whether Montana's law violated the
defendant's right to "a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations,"209 the Court found that Montana had "valid" reasons for
excluding evidence of voluntary intoxication.2 10 Intoxicated people
211
commit many violent crimes. Moreover, prohibiting defendants
from presenting evidence of voluntary intoxication for the purpose of
raising reasonable doubt about mens rea might deter people
from becoming intoxicated, or from committing crimes while
intoxicated.212 And if some people do become intoxicated and commit
crimes, prohibiting them from presenting evidence of their voluntary
intoxication will help ensure that they are imprisoned and thereby
prevented from committing future crimes.213 Finally, the prohibition
accords with the general sense that if someone chooses to become
204 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (plurality opinion).
205 See id. at 49-51.
206 Id. at 43.
20 Id. at 49 (referring to "the common-law rule prohibiting consideration of voluntary
intoxication in the determination of mens rea").208 Id.
209 Id. at 53.210 d. ("[T]he introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the State for a 'valid'
reason, as it has been by Montana."). The Court also observed that "the common-law rule
prohibiting consideration of voluntary intoxication in the determination of mens rea" is a rule
that "has considerable justification." Id. at 49.
211 Id. ("A large number of crimes, especially violent crimes, are committed by intoxicated
offenders; modem studies put the numbers as high as half of all homicides, for example.").
212Id. at 49-50 ("Disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication has the effect of
increasing the punishment for all unlawful acts committed in that state, and thereby deters
drunkenness or irresponsible behavior while drunk.").
2 13 Id. at 50 ("The rule also serves as a specific deterrent, ensuring that those who prove
incapable of controlling violent impulses while voluntarily intoxicated go to prison.").
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intoxicated, it is fair to punish her for whatever crimes she then
214
commits while in that condition.
Voluntary intoxication, though, is not schizophrenia. There are
several important differences between prohibiting evidence of
voluntary intoxication and prohibiting evidence of a mental illness
such as schizophrenia. First, while the common law might not have
recognized voluntary intoxication as a defense, the common law
certainly recognized a defense arising out of severe mental
disorder.215 Additionally, Arizona does not have valid reasons for
excluding all mental disorder evidence. People with even severe
mental illnesses are unlikely to commit violent crimes.216 And those
who because of a mental illness are a danger to themselves or others
may be detained and treated under civil commitment laws, 2 17
lessening the need to rely on criminal convictions to deter or
incapacitate.218 Finally, while people often choose to become
intoxicated, people do not choose to develop schizophrenia. Neither
the same practical considerations nor the same moral considerations
that might warrant excluding evidence of voluntary intoxication
similarly warrant excluding evidence of a mental illness such as
schizophrenia.219
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that at a minimum, criminal defendants
should be allowed to present two specific types of mental disorder
2 14 Id. ("(T]he rule comports with and implements society's moral perception that one who
has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the consequences.").
2 15 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) ("It was well settled at common law
that 'idiots,' together with 'lunatics,' were not subject to punishment for criminal acts
committed under those incapacities."), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
216 See Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with
Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 1269, 1284 (2000) ("Recent research demonstrates that most individuals with mental
illness are slightly less dangerous than the general public.").
217 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
218 Moreover, civil commitment is preferable to criminal sanctions to the extent that civil
commitment aims to prevent dangerous or violent behaviors, while criminal sanctions are
imposed after the harmful behavior has already occurred.
219 As Stephen Garvey explains,
Treating a voluntarily intoxicated actor as if he possessed a mental state he did not in
fact possess is one thing: A voluntarily intoxicated actor is at least responsible for
becoming intoxicated. Treating a mentally ill actor as if he possessed a mental state
he did not in fact possess is another: A mentally ill actor is ordinarily responsible
neither for becoming mentally ill nor for the behavioral manifestations of his illness.
Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEw CRIM. L. REV. 119, 137 n.51
(2008).
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evidence. First, defendants should be allowed to present evidence to
educate jurors about the facts of mental disorder--evidence
explaining that people who have not been charged with any crime and
therefore have little or no incentive to lie about such things do
experience symptoms that might seem too strange to be believed.
Second, defendants should be allowed to present evidence of their
own pre-offense mental disorder histories. Both of these kinds of
evidence will in most cases be helpful and trustworthy. In cases
where the evidence is not, trial judges should be counted on to
exclude it, just as they are counted on to exclude any other evidence
that is not helpful or trustworthy.
That at least some mental disorder evidence is consistently helpful
and trustworthy means that, contrary to the Supreme Court's
assessment of such evidence in Clark, the untrustworthiness of mental
disorder evidence cannot justify rules that categorically prohibit
criminal defendants from presenting mental disorder evidence to
disprove mens rea. Criminal defendants do not have an absolute right
to present all relevant evidence, but they do have a right to rules that
do not exclude more evidence than is warranted by the state interest
the exclusion is intended to advance. Arizona's rule excludes far more
evidence than is warranted. This rule therefore threatens criminal
defendants' due process right to present evidence for the purpose of
raising reasonable doubt. And as with all rules that risk violations of
trial rights, the harmful consequences of Arizona's rule extend
beyond individual defendants to include the state and the public, both
of which also have an interest in the ability of juries to reach fair,
accurate verdicts in criminal trials.
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